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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this matter is vested in this Court pursuant to the provisions of 
U.C.A. § 78-2a-2(2)(h). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in not awarding Petitioner permanent 
alimony? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Trial courts may exercise broad discretion in divorce matters so long as the 
decision is within the confines of legal precedence and supported with adequate findings 
of fact and conclusions of law. Where the trial court may exercise broad discretion, the 
appellate court presumes the correctness of the court's decision absent manifest injustice 
or inequity that indicates a clear abuse of discretion. Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 944, 
946 (Utah App. 1998). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE FOR APPEAL 
The primary issue in the trial of this matter was whether Petitioner was entitled to 
an award of permanent alimony. The majority of the testimony and evidence presented at 
the trial focused on the factors to be evaluated pursuant to U.C.A. § 30-3-5(7)(a). (R. 
150). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
U.C.A. § 30-3-5 (1999 Supplement). (Attached as Addendum A to Brief of 
Appellant). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises out of an action for divorce. The only issue on appeal is 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in not awarding Petitioner permanent 
alimony. 
Petitioner filed this action on or about March 10, 1998. (R. 3). On or about 
January 13, 1999, the trial court entered a temporary order requiring Respondent to pay 
temporary alimony to Petitioner in the amount of $1,500.00 per month commencing 
October, 1999, and continuing through the date of the trial, July 14, 1999. 
The trial was held before the Honorable Ray Harding, Jr., in the Fourth District 
Court in and for Utah County, on July 14, 1999. Most issues in the case were resolved 
by stipulation (R. 128, paragraph 5, 6, and 7); (R. 127 paragraphs 9, 11, and 12). The 
issues tried to the court were: 
1. Petitioner's entitlement to an award of permanent alimony, if any; 
2. The parties' respective obligations to pay a certain debt; 
3. Petitioner's entitlement to an award of attorney's fees, if any; and 
4. Petitioner's allegation that Respondent should be held in contempt for 
not having paid part of the temporary alimony awarded pursuant to the court's temporary 
order of January 13, 1999. 
Petitioner and Respondent submitted testimony and exhibits in support of their 
positions (R. 150). The trial court adopted the stipulations of the parties, ordered 
Respondent to assume and pay the debt in the amount of approximately $2,200.00, and 
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ordered Respondent to pay Petitioner's attorney's fees and court costs incurred in the 
amount of $6,986.25. The trial court determined that Respondent was not in contempt of 
the court's temporary order and, finally, determined that Petitioner was not entitled to an 
award of permanent alimony. (R. 119, paragraph 69). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner and Respondent were married on March 31,1989 in Las Vegas, 
Nevada. (R. 150 pg. 9, Ins. 16-18; pg 10, Ins. 8-9). No children were bom as issue of 
this marriage. (R. 150 pg. 8, Ins. 20-25). 
This marriage was Petitioner's third marriage. (R. 150 pg. 8, In. 12). Petitioner 
has two adult children from former relationships, namely, David Rowe, age 32, and 
Amber Simcoe, age 28. (R. 150 pg. 8, In. 18). 
Initially, at the time of the parties' marriage, they resided in Anaheim, California 
until Respondent's employment with National Cinema Service transferred him to Utah. 
(R. 150 pg.l 1,1ns. 21-24). 
Petitioner's daughter, Amber, resides with Petitioner and suffers from "Williams 
Syndrome." (R. 150 pg. 9, In. 5). Amber participates in a sheltered workshop on a daily 
basis during the hours of 9:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. (R. 150 pg. 42, Ins. 23-25; pg. 43, Ins. 4-
6). At the time of trial, Petitioner generally worked at the Super Target store in Orem, 
Utah, beginning at 2:30 p.m. and working until 10:00 p.m. Notwithstanding Amber's 
handicap, Amber is capable of being alone and caring for herself during those times that 
Petitioner is at work. (R. 150 pg. 43). 
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During the period of March 1989 through approximately January 1, 1995, 
Petitioner was not employed except as a self-employed Tupperware salesperson earning 
limited income. (R. 150 pg. 54, In. 10; R. 125 f 28). Also during the marriage, Petitioner 
obtained training to become a manicurist/nail technician and obtained a license in that 
field from the State of California which she maintained current through the date of the 
trial. (R. 150 pg. 39, Ins. 10-25). Petitioner had at least one opportunity to engage in 
employment as a manicurist/nail technician in Orem, Utah, at the Western Hair Salon. 
She did not pursue this employment. (R. 150 pg. 40, Ins. 6-17). 
In August of 1994, Respondent relocated to the State of California to pursue 
employment with Pacific Theaters. (R. 150 pg. 12, Ins. 2-4; pg. 44, Ins. 14-17; pg. 60, 
Ins. 2-12). At the time Respondent secured employment with Pacific Theaters in 
California, he requested and invited Petitioner and her daughter, Amber, to accompany 
him to California to reside there with him while he pursued his employment 
opportunities. Petitioner emphatically refused to accompany Respondent to California 
and informed him that she would not relocate. (R. 150 pg. 60, Ins. 2-10; pg. 62 Ins. 22-
25; pg. 63, Ins. 1-2; pg. 86, In. 25; pg. 87, Ins. 1-7). At the time of the Respondent's 
relocation to California, Petitioner's son, daughter-in-law, grandson, and mother all 
resided in California. (R. 123 141). 
During the period of approximately August 1994 through August of 1995, 
Respondent traveled to Utah to spend time with Petitioner one to two times per month. 
(R. 150 pg. 62, In. 4; R. 123 142). Beginning in or about August of 1995, and 
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continuing thereafter until approximately April of 1996, Respondent's visits to Utah 
from California became less frequent and occurred approximately every six weeks until 
April of 1996. (R.150pg. 63, In. 6; R. 122, f 43). 
In April of 1996, Respondent became employed with the Walt Disney Company 
in southern California, and was no longer able to make regular trips to Utah County, 
Utah. (R. 150, pg. 63, Ins. 11-12; R. 122 f 44). During the period of approximately 
August 1994 through March 1996, Petitioner made no more than three visits per year to 
California. (R. 150pg. 63 In. 17). 
Respondent voluntarily paid approximately $1,800.00 per month to Petitioner to 
assist in her support for the four year period of August 1994 to approximately September 
1998. (R. 120159; R. 150 pg. 66, Ins. 16-18; R. 150 pg. 67, Ins. 2-9). On or about 
January 13, 1999, the Fourth District Court awarded Petitioner the sum of $1,500.00 per 
month as temporary alimony commencing October of 1998. (R. at 77). 
After Respondent's relocation to California in August of 1994, Petitioner became 
employed by Ernst, earning approximately $1,000.00 per month. (R. 125 % 25; R. 150 
pg. 34, Ins. 15-19; pg. 35 Ins. 1-6). In 1997, Petitioner became employed by Super 
Target and, at the time of trial, earned $7.25 per hour for approximately twenty-five (25) 
hours per week. (R. 150 pg. 23, In. 5). 
When Respondent initially relocated to California, he resided in the home of 
Respondent's mother and was not required to pay rent, however, he assisted in paying 
some of the household utilities and buying food and household supplies. Thereafter, 
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Respondent moved in with Petitioner's son and daughter-in-law for a very short period 
of time until he moved in with his father. Again, Respondent was not required to pay 
rent, but did assist in the payment of utility bills and other household expenses. These 
living arrangements allowed Respondent to provide funds to Petitioner in Utah. (R. 150 
pg. 64, Ins. 22-25; pg. 65, Ins. 1-25; pg. 66, Ins. 1-13). 
Notwithstanding Respondent's repeated requests, Petitioner refused to relocate to 
California to reside with Respondent. (R. 150 pg. 60, Ins. 2-7; pg. 62, Ins. 19-25; pg. 63, 
Ins. 1, 2; pg. 86, In. 25; pg. 87, Ins. 1-7). 
In September of 1997, Respondent filed a Petition for Dissolution of Marriage in 
the Los Angeles Superior Court seeking an order dissolving the parties' marriage and 
requesting division of their combined assets. (R. 5). This California dissolution action 
was not pursued and ultimately dismissed by Respondent. (R.150 pg. 86, Ins. 6-16). 
At the time of the trial, Petitioner remained employed at the Super Target store in 
Orem, Utah, on a full time basis working approximately twenty-five (25) hours per week 
at the rate of $7.25 per hour. (R. 150 pg. 22, Ins. 10-21; pg. 23, Ins. 4-8). In 1998, 
Petitioner had gross annual earnings of $10,438.99. (R. 150 pg. 23, Ins. 13-15; R. 151 
Petitioner's Exhibit 7). Petitioner had a net monthly income at the time of trial of 
approximately $600.00 per month. (R. 150 pg. 26, Ins. 17-19; R. 125 f 27). In addition 
to this net income, Petitioner also received Supplemental Security Income on behalf of 
her daughter, Amber, in the amount of $500.00 per month. (R. 150 pg. 26, Ins. 20-23; R. 
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125 Tf 27). Petitioner had reasonable and necessary monthly expenses of approximately 
$2,415.00 per month. (R. 150 pg. 26, Ins. 9-11; R. 125124). 
At the time of the trial, Respondent was employed by the Walt Disney Company 
in southern California and earned $31,175 per hour, as a weekly contract employee and 
was guaranteed 43.2 hours per week of work with gross monthly income of 
approximately $6,005.00. (R. 150 pg. 70, Ins. 11-25; pg. 71, Ins. 1-7; R. 121 f 57; R. 
151, Respondent's Exhibit 6). Respondent had reasonable and necessary monthly 
expenses totaling approximately $3,878.53. (R. 150 pg. 82, Ins. 15-16; Respondent's 
Exhibit 6; R.120 If 62). At the time of trial, Respondent had guaranteed net monthly 
income of approximately $3,449.00 per month. (R. 150 pg. 84, Ins. 8-10; Respondent's 
Exhibit 6; R. 120 % 63). At the time of trial, the parties had been separated and lived 
apart for more than five years. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Trial courts have broad discretion in awarding alimony. The trial court's exercise 
of broad discretion is presumed correct absent manifest injustice or inequity that 
indicates a clear abuse of discretion and, so long as the trial court's decision is within the 
confines of legal precedence and is supported by adequate findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. The trial court correctly reviewed all of the appropriate factors set 
forth in U.C.A. § 30-3-5 (1999 Supp.) regarding whether or not it should award alimony. 
The court fully evaluated the Petitioner's financial needs and condition; the 
Petitioner's capacity or ability to produce income; the ability of the Respondent to 
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provide support; the financial condition and need of the Respondent; and, the length of 
the parties' marriage. Based upon full consideration of these factors, and the evidence 
submitted by the parties at trial, the trial court determined that Petitioner was not entitled 
to an award of permanent alimony. 
The trial court correctly exercised its broad discretion in determining that 
Petitioner was not entitled to an award of permanent alimony and, supported its decision 
with adequate findings and conclusions as required by Utah law. Therefore, the trial 
court's decision must be upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN NOT 
AWARDING PERMANENT ALIMONY TO THE PETITIONER. 
It is well settled in Utah that trial courts may exercise broad discretion in awarding 
alimony so long as the decision is within the confines of legal precedence and supported 
by adequate findings and conclusions. Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 944, 946 (Utah 
App. 1998). Where the trial court may exercise such broad discretion, the appellate court 
presumes the correctness of the court's decision absent "manifest injustice or inequity 
that indicates a clear abuse of... discretion." Id. at 944, quoting Hanson v. Hanson, 736 
P.2d 1055,1056 (Utah App. 1987). Generally, appellate courts give great deference to 
the trial court's findings of fact in divorce cases and do not overturn them unless they are 
clearly erroneous. Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah App. 1993). Furthermore, 
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appellate courts generally give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of witnesses. Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305, 1307-08 (Utah App. 
1991). 
The court properly considered all factors required by U.C.A. § 30-3-5(7) (1999 
Supp.) in determining whether Petitioner was entitled to an award of permanent alimony. 
The court heard and received the Petitioner's testimony regarding her earnings from her 
employment at Super Target in Orem, Utah, and found that Petitioner was employed 
twenty-five (25) hours per week at the rate of $7.25 per hour with a gross monthly 
income of approximately $1,000.00 and a net monthly income of approximately $600.00. 
(R. 150 pg. 22, Ins. 8-25; pg. 26, Ins. 17-19; R. 125 % 27). The court also determined that 
Petitioner received Supplemental Security Income benefits on behalf of her handicapped 
daughter, Amber, in the approximate amount of $500.00 per month. (R. 150 pg. 26, Ins. 
20-23). 
The court determined that during the course of the marriage, Petitioner received 
training and a license from the State of California to work as a manicurist/nail technician 
and, that her California license had been maintained current through the date of the trial 
of this case. (R. 150 pg. 39, Ins. 15-25; pg. 40, Ins. 1-17; R. 125 125, 30, 31). 
The court determined that although Petitioner's daughter, Amber, is handicapped, 
she participates in a sheltered workshop each day during the hours of approximately 9:00 
a.m. to 3:00 p.m. (R. 150 pg. 43, In. 6; R. 124 f 32). The court heard undisputed 
testimony that the Petitioner's regular work hours are generally from 2:30 p.m. to 10:00 
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p.m. and sometimes as late as 2:00 a.m.; and therefore, Petitioner was not at home in the 
evenings to care for her daughter, Amber. (R. 150 pg. 42, Ins. 23-25; pg. 43, Ins. 1-10, 
18-25; R. 124 f 32 and 33). The trial court also determined that the Petitioner's 
handicapped daughter was capable of being alone and caring for herself during those 
times that the Petitioner was required to work. (R. 150 pg. 43, Ins. 7-25; pg. 44, Ins. 1-
3). Therefore, Petitioner is available to work hours in addition to twenty-five (25) hours 
per week. Petitioner also receives $500.00 per month from Social Security for her 
daughter, Amber. 
The court also determined that the Petitioner has reasonable monthly expenses of 
approximately $2,415.00 per month. (R. 150 pg. 26, Ins. 9-11; R. 125 f 24; Petitioner's 
Exhibit 8). 
The court evaluated the Respondent's earnings, income, and ability to provide 
Petitioner with support, including, a consideration of the Respondent's reasonable needs 
as required by Utah law. See, Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah App. 
1995). Specifically, the court determined that at the time of trial, the Respondent had 
been employed full time by the Walt Disney Company since April of 1996. (R. 150 pg. 
69, In. 25; pg. 70, Ins. 1-10). The court determined that the Respondent's rate of pay was 
$31.175 per hour and that his employer guaranteed that he could work 43.2 hours each 
week, totaling a gross monthly income of approximately $6,005.00 gross per month. (R. 
150 pg. 70, Ins. 11-25; R. 151, Respondent's Exhibits 5 and 6). (Attached as Addendum 
C and D to Brief of Appellant). 
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The court determined that in 1997, Respondent had gross income of $107,388.50 
and, that in 1998, Respondent had gross annual income of $100,504.00. The court 
further determined that this income included substantial amounts of overtime. (R. 150 
pg. 74, Ins. 9-11; pg. 75, Ins. 16-17, 23-25; pg. 76, In. 1). Respondent testified that his 
base pay, exclusive of overtime, was approximately $67,000.00 per year. (R. 74 Ins. 18-
19). 
The court determined from the Respondent's undisputed testimony that 
Respondent's ability to work overtime had been severely curtailed in 1999 (R. 150 pg. 
76, Ins. 19-22) and further, that Respondent had been required to take a one-week 
furlough from his employment during the last week of May, 1999. (R. 150 pg. 80, Ins. 
14-18; R. 121158). 
Based upon the testimony submitted at trial, the court determined that during the 
period of August 1994 through approximately May 31,1999, Respondent's monthly 
expenses were reduced because he was able to reside in the home of his father and, for a 
time, in the home of Petitioner's mother without an obligation to pay rent. (R. 150 pg. 
64, Ins. 22-24; pg. 65, Ins. 24-25; pg. 66, Ins. 1-8). Therefore, Respondent was able to 
provide Petitioner with approximately $450.00 per week to assist her in her support from 
August 1994 through September of 1998. (R. 150 pg. 66, Ins. 16-18; R. 120 f 59). 
The court determined that the Respondent's net monthly income, based upon his 
base wage of $31.175 per hour for a guaranteed 43.2 hour week equaled approximately 
$3,449.00. (R. 150 pg. 84, Ins. 8-10; R. 120 f 63; R. 151, Respondent's Exhibit 6). The 
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court also determined that Respondent had reasonable financial needs for his own 
support of approximately $3,878.53. (R. 150 pg. 82, Ins. 15-16; Respondent's Exhibit 6; 
R. 120 f 62). 
After considering these initial three financial factors, the court considered the 
length of the parties' marriage. The court determined that beginning in or about August 
of 1994, the parties' relationship changed from a marital relationship to a friendship and 
occasional sexual relationship. The court determined that the parties had lived apart as 
long as they had resided together. (R. 150 pg. 11, In. 25; pg. 12, Ins. 1-5; pg. 59 Ins. 19-
25; pg. 60, Ins. 1-12; pg. 152, Ins. 8-21). 
Based upon the testimony of the parties, the trial court also determined that the 
Petitioner had refused to relocate to California with Respondent when he obtained new 
employment there and that this refusal was unreasonable. (R. 150 pg. 60, Ins. 2-10; pg. 
62 Ins. 22-25; pg. 63, Ins. 1-2; pg. 86, In. 25; pg. 87, Ins. 1-7). 
Based upon all the evidence submitted by the parties, the trial court specifically 
determined that the most determinative factor of all of the factors weighed by the court in 
determining whether or not to award Petitioner alimony was the Petitioner's refusal to 
accompany the Respondent to California when requested by the Respondent that she do 
so. Based upon this refusal, the court determined that at the point the Respondent 
relocated to California, the parties were separated and that their marital relationship had 
effectively terminated based upon Petitioner's refusal to go with the Respondent to 
California. (R. 150 pg. 152, Ins. 8-21). 
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The court determined that based upon Petitioner's refusal to accompany the 
Respondent to California, the marriage was a "short term marriage." (R. 150 pg. 152, 
Ins. 9-10). The court therefore implicitly considered the fault of the parties as permitted 
by U.C.A. § 30-3-5(7)(b) (1999 Supp.) when determining alimony, and determined that 
the Petitioner was at fault in causing the divorce by her unjustified refusal to accompany 
the Respondent to California. The court specifically determined that the Respondent's 
testimony on the issue of the Petitioner's refusal to accompany him to California was 
more credible than that of the Petitioner. (R. 150 pg. 157, Ins. 8-12). 
After hearing all of the evidence submitted by each of the parties, the court fully 
evaluated the factors to determine whether to award alimony as required by U.C.A. § 30-
3-5(7). In the exercise of its broad discretion, and after consideration of all relevant facts 
and equitable principles, the court determined that the Petitioner was not entitled to an 
award of permanent alimony and that Respondent had fulfilled his obligation to pay 
alimony/support to the Petitioner. Therefore, the trial court determined that Respondent 
had no further responsibility to pay alimony after the date of trial, July 14,1999. 
It is clear that the court evaluated each party's financial condition and 
circumstances and ordered the Respondent to assume responsibility for a $2,200.00 debt 
incurred by the Petitioner during the pendency of the action on the basis that Respondent 
was more financially able to assume and pay that debt. (R. 150 pg. 151, Ins. 15-19). 
Furthermore, the court determined that because of the disparity in the parties' financial 
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positions, Respondent should be required to pay the Petitioner's attorney's fees and costs. 
(R. 150 pg. l 51,1ns. 20-25). 
The court carefully evaluated all of the factors required to determine the 
Petitioner's entitlement to an award of permanent alimony. After making a full and 
complete evaluation of these factors, the trial court, in an exercise of its broad discretion, 
appropriately determined that Petitioner was not entitled to an award of permanent 
alimony from the Respondent. Included as one of the factors considered by the court was 
the court's determination that based upon the length of time the parties had been 
separated, due ta Petitioner's refusal to relocate, from August 1994 through July 14, 
1999, the date of trial, the marriage was in fact a short term marriage and, in view of the 
other factors considered, an award of permanent alimony to the Petitioner was not 
appropriate. 
Appellate courts do not disturb a trial court's alimony award absent a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of the considerable discretion granted the trial court in determining the 
award. Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah App. 1996 citing Breinholt v. 
Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah App. 1995)). 
It is undisputed that the court considered the Petitioner's financial conditions and 
needs, the ability of the Petitioner to produce sufficient income and, the ability of the 
Respondent to provide support in view of his reasonable financial needs. The trial court 
made detailed findings on each of these factors which clearly enables this Court to ensure 
that the trial court's determination was rationally based upon the evaluation of all of 
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these factors. Where the trial court may exercise broad discretion, the appellate court 
presumes the correctness of the court's decision absent "manifest injustice or inequity 
that indicates a clear abuse of... discretion." Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 944 (Utah 
App. 1998, citing Hanson v. Hanson, 736 P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah App. 1987)). 
In this case, there is no evidence of manifest injustice or inequity which would 
indicate a clear abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination that the Petitioner is 
not entitled to an award of permanent alimony. The court determined that the 
Respondent had fulfilled his obligation to Petitioner by providing support to her during 
the period of August 1,1994 through July 14,1999. 
POINT II 
PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IN 
SUPPORT OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND, THE FINDINGS 
OF FACT ARE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE IN THE 
RECORD, 
Petitioner challenges the trial court's finding that Respondent's expenses exceed 
his income and therefore, contends that the trial court's finding on this issue is clearly 
erroneous. 
It is well settled in Utah law that when challenging the trial court's findings of 
fact, the party making the challenge must marshal all of the evidence in support of those 
findings and, then demonstrate that despite the evidence, the trial court's findings are so 
lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them 
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clearly erroneous. Matter of Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885 (Utah 1989) citing State v. 
Walker, 143 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming 
the devil's advocate. Counsel must extricate 
himself or herself from the client's shoes and 
fully assume the adversary's position. In order 
to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the 
evidence, the challenger must present in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap 
of competent evidence introduced at trial which 
supports the very findings the appellant resists. 
After constructing this magnificent array of 
supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret 
out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of 
this flaw must be sufficient to convince the 
appellate court that the court's finding resting 
upon the evidence is clearly erroneous. 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). When an appellant fails to meet the 
"heavy burden" of marshaling the evidence, we "assume that 
the record supports the findings of the court." Wade v. Stangl, 
869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Saunders v. 
Sharp, 806 P.2d 198,199 (Utah 1991). 
Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431 at 437 (Utah App. 1999). 
In this case, the Petitioner has failed to meet the "heavy burden" of marshaling the 
evidence. The trial court found that Respondent's net income was $3,449.00 per month. 
(R. 120, ^ f 63). In support of this finding, the trial court considered and accepted the 
Respondent's financial declaration dated July 13,1999 which reflected this net monthly 
income. (R. 151, Respondent's Exhibit 6, attached as Addendum D to Brief of 
Appellant). Furthermore, the trial court heard undisputed testimony by Respondent that 
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he is paid at an hourly rate of $31.175 per hour and, as a weekly contract employee, is 
guaranteed 43.2 hours per week every week that he works. (R. 150 pg. 70, Ins. 12-25). 
The trial court heard and accepted as credible, testimony that in 1997, Respondent was 
able to work substantial amounts of overtime. (R. 150 pg. 74, Ins. 12-25; pg. 75, Ins. 1-
5). The court found that by 1999 the Respondent's opportunity to work overtime had 
diminished. (R. 121 f 58). The undisputed evidence reflected that beginning in 1998, 
less overtime was available to Respondent and his income decreased. (R. 150 pg. 75, 
Ins. 12-25; pg. 76, In. 1). The undisputed testimony was that in 1999, the Respondent's 
ability to work overtime had been "severely curtailed" and he had been furloughed for 
one week. (R. 150 pg. 76, Ins. 16-25; pg. 77, Ins. 1-9; pg. 80, Ins. 14-16). 
The trial court reviewed the Respondent's year-to-date earnings for 1999 and 
determined that for the first sixth months of 1999, Respondent had gross earnings 
totaling $45,604.46. (R. 121, f 57). As is reflected in the testimony, this amount reflects 
a substantial reduction from Respondent's monthly earnings in 1997. (R. 150 pg. 74, Ins. 
9-11; pg. 75, Ins. 12-17). Based upon the evidence before the court, the trial court 
determined that Respondent had a guaranteed net monthly income of approximately 
$3,449.00. (R. 120 f 63). This figure was based upon his hourly rate of $31.175 for a 
guaranteed work week of 43.2 hours per week and, the determination that the 
Respondent's ability to work overtime had been severely reduced. 
Clearly, the findings regarding Respondent's net monthly income, based upon his 
guaranteed hourly wage and work week, are supported by the evidence. Petitioner 
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argues that because Respondent made more money and had a greater income in prior 
years, those amounts should be determined to be his present income. In this case, 
however, the trial court determined that the Respondent's net monthly income was based 
upon that income that he was guaranteed and that his future ability to work overtime was 
uncertain. 
Petitioner next challenges the trial court's determination that Respondent had 
reasonable and necessary monthly expenses of $3,878.53 as set forth in his financial 
declaration. (R. 151, Respondent's Exhibit 6; R. 120 f 62). In connection with the 
Respondent's expenses, the court heard testimony as to how Respondent calculated his 
monthly expenses as set forth in his financial declaration. As Petitioner notes, on cross-
examination, Respondent conceded that he had not been able to pay $600.00 per month 
as tithing, but had claimed it on his financial declaration as a monthly expense. (R. 150 
pg. 103, Ins. 21-22). No other expenses were disputed by Petitioner as set forth on the 
Respondent's financial declaration. (R. 151, Respondent's Exhibit 6; R. 150 pp. 104, 
105, 106 and 107). 
Even if the $600.00 tithing amount is deducted from the other undisputed 
expenses testified to by the Respondent and included in his sworn financial declaration, 
the inclusion of that amount as a portion of the Respondent's reasonable and necessary 
expenses is hardly "a fatal flaw in the evidence." Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431,437 
(Utah App. 1999). Furthermore, even if this tithing expense is deducted, Respondent 
still has limited if any ability to provide support to Petitioner. 
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Petitioner also contends that the court's findings essentially give Respondent's 
monthly expenses priority over his duty to support the Petitioner. In fact, it is well settled 
that any evaluation of a payor spouse's ability to provide support must include an 
analysis of the payor spouse's reasonable needs and expenses. Breinholt v. Breinholt, 
905 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah App. 1995). "The payor spouse's reasonable needs are a 
necessary subsidiary step in determining the ability to provide support." Willey v. Willey, 
866 P.2d 547, 551 and n. 1 (Utah App. 1993). Here, the respondent had a car payment of 
$398.53 each month and credit card debt requiring a payment of $200.00 per month. 
Such expenses are hardly unreasonable or excessive and were, appropriately, deemed 
reasonable by the trial court. 
In the instant case, the relevant facts contained within the record are clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment. In 
this case, the findings of fact are supported by the clear weight of the evidence and, 
therefore, cannot be determined to be clearly erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award Petitioner 
permanent alimony in this case. The trial court has broad discretion in determining one's 
entitlement to alimony and, alimony awards will be upheld unless a clear and prejudicial 
abuse of discretion is demonstrated. In this case, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
manifest injustice or inequity has occurred and therefore, the trial court's decision is 
presumed to be correct. 
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Petitioner has failed to marshal the evidence with regard to her claim that the court 
erred in finding that Respondent did not have sufficient income to cover his reasonable 
and necessary monthly expenses. The Petitioner has not presented this Court with a 
comprehensive and fastidious statement of all competent evidence introduced at the trial 
which supports the findings which Petitioner challenges. In view of the appellant's 
failure to meet her heavy burden of marshaling the evidence, this Court must assume that 
the record supports the findings of the trial court. 
DATED this of August, 2000. 
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